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We present a growth model in which the work morale of R&D workers is endo-
genously determined by fair wage considerations and show that increases in 
endowments of researchers do not necessarily have positive growth effects. The 
results is in line with the empirical observations that the very large increases in the 
number of R&D workers during the last 30 years have not generated the growth 
rates predicted by the basic endogenous growth models. Moreover, a number of 
mechanisms are present in the model that counteract the positive growth effects of 
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The growth literature is much focused on the incentives that firms have to invest in
R&D. The studies typically investigate the effects of, for instance, factor supply changes,
R&D subsidies, etc., on the inputs of R&D workers in the growth process. A closely
related, yet neglected, issue concerns the incentives that the individual R&D workers
have to perform well. This neglect in the literature is most surprising since many growth
models describe researchers as participants in R&D races between firms and these
researchers’ work morale then stands out both as an important source of success to the
firm and an engine of growth to the economy. Firms’ dependence on the research staff
implies strong incentives to introduce compensation policies that would stimulate R&D
workers to perform well and, not surprisingly, a large literature on this issue has arisen.
             Allowing for variations in the individual R&D worker’s effort could potentially
help explain important stylized facts which are the focus of many recent theoretical
growth studies. One such fact is that the observed dramatic increases in the employment
of R&D workers like scientists and engineers, have not yielded the increases in economic
growth rates that are predicted by the basic endogenous growth models. While workers
engaged in research have almost doubled in the US and increased at similar rates in many
other developed countries during the last thirty years, per capita growth rates have been
constant or even declined.1
           Several theoretical explanations to these empirical observations have been
offered, all based on modifying the scale assumptions of basic growth models. Jones
(1995b) shows that a Romer model modified for the scale effects can account for the
fact that economic growth has not  accelerated to the rates predicted by basic
endogenous growth theory. The elimination of the scale effects induces, however, a
return to models based on exogenous growth in the Solow spirit. To allow for sustained
growth, Young (1998) modifies the Grossman-Helpman ”quality ladders” model by
allowing for an endogenous degree of product variety and finds that rent dissipation
through product proliferation could lower growth. Also starting with the ”quality
ladders” model, Segerstrom (1999) shows that a model that allows for R&D to become
                                                       
1 See Jones (1995a) for an extended discussion.2
increasingly more difficult over time yields predictions that are theoretically consistent
with these basic observations including observations on constant number of patents.
Similar conclusions are obtained in Kortum (1997).
            The present study offers another and quite different explanation that may serve
as another piece to add to the puzzle: Introducing endogenous work morale in a basic
growth model we find that there need no longer be positive growth effects of increases
in the number of R&D workers.
            Another stylized fact, noted by Jones (1995a) is that, for the OECD countries,
human capital formation trends upwards while growth rates do not. In line with this
observation, our model reveals a number of effects that tend to counteract growth when
workers go to higher education and which growth models based on competitive wage
setting are unable to capture. Several forces reduce effort and increase the under
utilization rate of R&D workers as human capital formation increases.
Much empirical research has been devoted to the determinants of workers’ effort
and these empirical findings appear consistent enough to serve as a basis for theoretical
studies on the relation between work morale and economic growth. One important line
of this research, for which empirical support is adding up at a fast pace, is based on
sociological and psychological notions of ”fair wage” motivations among workers as
determinants of work effort. In evaluating a large set of labor market theories on pay by
means of interviews with 300 business people, labor leaders and counselors of
unemployed, Bewley (1998) finds much support for the ”fair wage” version of efficiency
wage theory developed by George Akerlof and Robert Solow, while almost all other
modern labor market theories tend to get rejected. The fair wage efficiency wage model
is also supported by a large number of other studies like Blinder and Choi (1990) for the
US, Kaufman (1984) for the UK, Agell and Lundborg (1995a) for Sweden, Campbell
and Kamlani (1997) for the US. All theses studies are based on interviews (or
questionnaires) with the people that actually set the wages in firms. Interestingly,
support for this model is also obtained by Fehr and Falk (1999) using an experimental
approach.2
The highly consistent messages of these studies, carried out in countries with3
highly diverging labor market institutions (like the US, UK and Sweden)  and based on
different methods (like interviews or questionnaires, and experiments) justifies the
specification of a basic growth model on the principal finding that fair wage
considerations determine effort of R&D workers. With the modern firms’ dependence on
R&D workers’ performance in mind, we introduce these aspects into a Grossman-
Helpman (1991a) quality ladders endogenous growth model.
Efficiency wage setting can be argued to be of particular relevance to groups of
workers like researchers, civil engineers and others that are directly involved in
improving the quality of goods. First, efficiency wage setting assumes that workers have
some latitude in determining their own effort. This assumption seems particularly easy to
accept for R&D workers since their effort is not determined by technological factors as
sometimes is the case for  workers on the assembly line or factory floor.
Secondly, it stands without reason that the performance of individual researchers
must be crucial to the performance of the firm. Without any breakthroughs in the
research lab of the medical company or in the designs of new cars in the auto company,
these firms’ possibilities to survive are threatened in the long run. The likelihood of a
research breakthrough, in turn, hinges on the incentives that R&D workers have to work
hard. Therefore, it is not surprising that the empirical literature mentioned above shows
that management is most concerned with maintaining good relations with workers as a
way to keep workers’ effort up.3 To maintain positive relations and high effort, we
assume that firms offer R&D workers a fair share of the expected returns to winning a
R&D race. This is not only a natural reference of fairness to the individual R&D worker
(besides relative wages and unemployment), but from the firm’s perspective it also offers
the right incentives for the R&D workers to make a research breakthrough that will
benefit the firm.
Section 2 presents the building blocs of the model and derives the system of
equations to be used. Comparative static results are presented and evaluated in section 3
and the final section offers some concluding remarks.
                                                                                                                                                                 
2 See also Akerlof (1982) for sociological and psychological evidence on the importance of the fair wage
hypothesis.
3 See in particular Campbell and Kamlani (1997).4
2 The Model
Some general comments
We assume a continuum of industries that are indexed by T,[0,1]. Firms participate in
R&D races that lead to quality improvements. In each industry, firms are distinguished
by quality j of the products they manufacture. The higher value of j the higher is the
quality and j takes on only integer values. At time t=0, the state-of-the-art quality
product in any industry is j=0, i.e., there is one firm in which the production workers
know how to manufacture a product of quality j=0 but no workers in any firm knows
how to produce a product of a higher quality. The R&D workers’ innovation implies
that the firm acquires the ability to manufacture a higher quality product. If the state-of-
the-art quality in an industry is j, the next firm to win a R&D race becomes the single
manufacturer of a j+1 quality product. Firms are Bertrand price-setters. Hence, a winner
of a R&D race can price lower quality competitors out of business and take over the
market in its industry. Over time, as new innovations push industries up the quality
ladder the economy grows. These are the basic ideas of the Grossman-Helpman (1991a)
growth model.
Labor is, in our model, of two kinds: R&D workers, Lr , and production workers,
Lp, which both are in fixed supplies. While R&D workers can work as production
workers, production workers cannot work as R&D workers. One unit of production
workers is required to produce one unit of output, regardless of quality. We treat the
wage rate of production workers as the numeraire and let w  denote the relative wage of
R&D workers.
Utility maximization and fair wages
All consumers live forever and have identical preferences. They maximize discounted
utility:
 U    e    U (t)dt, 0
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where D is the subjective rate of discount and  log U t
s( ) is each consumer’s static utility
at time t, which is given by:5
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The first term represents consumption decisions where d(j, t, T) denotes the quantity
consumed of a product of quality j produced in industry T at time t. The parameter  8>1
represents the extent to which higher quality products improve on lower quality
products, i.e., the size of the step on the quality ladder.
The second term applies to R&D workers only and represents effort and is zero for
production workers and asset holders.4 Utility is affected by the actual effort e t ( ), which
is determined by the optimizing individual R&D worker. The term represents the
decision to supply work effort and reflects the fair wage considerations.
To determine e, we first assume that the individual R&D worker compares his
wage to that of the production workers, w p, which is in line with basic efficiency wage
theory. 13.3 percent of firms in Campbell and Kamlani (1997) claim that high wages are
the most important factor to stimulate effort of  white collar workers.
Secondly, we may note that Campbell and Kamlani also find a strong link between
the firm’s profits  and workers’ perceived fair wage.5 They also report that two thirds of
US firms claim that ”Good management-worker relationships” is the most important
factor to stimulate white collar workers’ work morale. Considering that profits is a
crucial element in the expected returns to winning a R&D race, a natural way to create
good relationships to R&D workers is to offer them what they consider to be a fair share
of the expected returns,u . We shall later define this variable but for the time being it
suffices to note that the individual R&D worker takes this expected reward as given in
the utility maximization process.
Thirdly, we assume that some share of the R&D workers is relegated to the factory
floor. Since this share in efficiency wage models is formally identical to the
unemployment rate, we represent this under utilization rate by u. This is the share of
                                                       
4 We do not extend the assumption of fair wage considerations to production workers. Although this
may seem to go against empirical findings, assuming that production workers’ effort also depends on
fair wage considerations is hardly warranted since, as argued, the growth of the firm, which is what we
focus on, hinges on R&D workers’ rather than production workers’ effort. Indeed, if production workers
are encompassed by the insight that the firm’s growth and probability of winning R&D races hinge on
researchers’ efforts, fair wages for production workers becomes a highly complex issue. The  added
complexity that an assumption of variable effort among production workers would  give rise to, would in
turn make the model intractable.6
R&D workers that is unemployed in their capacity as R&D workers. The unemployment
rate is a standard argument in efficiency wage theory and almost ten percent of the firms
in the Campbell and Kamlani study claim that high unemployment is the most important
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     Let e* denote the optimal level of effort that obtains by solving equation (3) for the
optimum values of wi, , u and u. (w p  will be normalized to 1.) We assume a concave
utility function U
e such that logU
e = 0 for e = e*, else logU
e p 0 which implies that,
in optimum when researchers have set their effort e=e*, all utility derives from
commodity consumption.7
       We may think of U
e as a function where the equilibrium effort determines the work
norm and any deviation in either direction from the work norm generates disutility. An
important thing to note is that comparative static changes in the model yield different
equilibrium effort levels and hence imply different work norms. It is only deviations from
the norms in the two cases that negatively affect utility U
e. That workers adjust to the
norm is one reason why firms sometimes replace poorly performing workers to let them
work in teams where the workers’ norms imply a higher work morale.
At each point in time t , each consumer allocates expenditure E to maximize log
u t ( )given the prevailing market prices. Solving this budget allocation problem yields a
unit elastic demand function
d = E / p, (4)
where d  is quantity demanded and  p is the market price for the product in each
industry with the lowest quality adjusted price. The quantity demanded for all other
products is zero.
R&D workers also determine their optimal effort level. Since their static utility  is
                                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Campbell and Kamlani, (1997) p. 775 and p. 785.
6 For derivation of effort functions see the seminal study by Akerlof (1982) and for extended versions
similar to the one presented here, see Agell and Lundborg (1995b).
7 It seems natural to assume that the individual R&D worker  compares his wage to other R&D workers,
i.e. thatw w i / should be included as an argument. With homogeneous R&D workers, this yields a unit7
additively separable and since the optimal effort level depends on wage formation
institutions, we return to the question of optimal effort later in the paper.
Given this static demand behavior, each consumer chooses the path of expenditure
over time to maximize (1) subject to the usual inter-temporal budget constraint. Solving
this optimal control problem yields8
dE(t)
dt
/ E(t)  =  r(t)- r, (5)
that is, a constant expenditure path is optimal if and only if the market interest rate ,r ,
equalsr . As we restrict attention to steady state properties of the model,r  is the
equilibrium interest rate throughout time and consumer expenditure is constant over
time. We let  E  denote aggregate steady state consumer expenditures.
The Behavior of Firms
a) The product market
One unit of labor produces one unit of output regardless of quality. Since production
workers’ wage rate has been normalized to one, every firm has a constant marginal cost
equal to one. When the researchers have innovated, the firm becomes the single quality
leader in its industry. Hence, whenever innovation occurs, the identity of industry leaders
changes.
We consider now the profits earned by a firm that has innovated successfully and
become the leader. With the follower charging a price of w p , which we normalize to
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where p is the price set by the market leader. Equation (6) implies that profits are
maximized by choosing  p = l . Therefore, this quality leader earns as a reward for its
innovative activity a profit flow equal to (1-1/l ) E . None of the other firms in the
industry can do any better than break even by selling nothing at all.
                                                                                                                                                                 
value in the effort function after the first order condition has been derived and has no real influence on
the model. Cf. Agell and Lundborg (1995b).8
b) R&D inputs.
The returns to engaging in R&D are independently distributed across industries and over
time. In industry T at time t, we let Ri denote the number of R&D workers employed by
firm i. What matters to us is the employment of R&D workers in efficiency units, i.e.
ei i l . We let  e ei i
i
l l =￿  denote the industry-wide R&D employment in efficiency
units. The instantaneous probability that some firm will be rewarded for R&D success is
assumed to be el. Individual R&D firms behave competitively and treat R as given, not
influenced by their choice of Ri.
  Let L denote the expected discounted rewards for winning an R&D race and let
s denote the government’s R&D subsidy rate. For a given effort ei, each firm chooses
its R&D employment li  to maximize instantaneous profits that equal
ue w s i i i l l - - ( ) 1 . For a steady state profit maximization equilibrium, the optimal level
of inputs of R&D workers implies that u = - w s e ( ) / 1 .
What are the rewards for winning R&D races? We know from equation (5) that in
any steady state equilibrium the market interest rate must equal r . The future profits
must first be discounted by r , but we must also consider that a quality leader eventually
is driven out of business by other firms’ further innovations. This occurs with
instantaneous probability elduring time span dt . Thus we obtain as an equilibrium R&D
condition that u  equals:
 














On the left hand side we have, in the numerator, the future profits. These are first
discounted by means of r  but the second term in the denominator captures that, in
equilibrium, leaders are eventually driven out of business by further innovation since the
instantaneous probability also appears in the denominator. The right hand side represents
the costs.
                                                                                                                                                                 
8 See Grossman and Helpman (1991a).9
c) Firms’ wage setting and the equilibrium effort.
R&D workers supply effort at a rate that is affected by their wage rate in comparison to
the wage of production workers and to the expected returns to winning a R&D race
which the R&D workers are involved in, as in equation (3). We then study efficiency
wage setting for the R&D workers, given the level of R&D workers employed, li .
Firms set the wage so as to extract more effort out of the individual R&D worker i
taking all other workers’ effort as given. Throughout the paper we assume that
production workers’ wages are set competitively.
Taking the R&D inputs and the expected returns to winning an R&D race as
given, the firm then determines the wage wi to minimize the wage per efficiency units of
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p / / + =1  (8)
where ew w
e
p / is the elasticity of effort with respect to an increase in w w p /  and e u w
e
/ is the
elasticity of effort with respect to an increase in w /u . This differs from the standard
Solow condition ew
e = 1 simply by that the sum of the two elasticities must equal unity in
equilibrium. After having assumed identical wages for all R&D workers, i.e. w w i = , set
w p to unity, and used the fact that u = - w s e ( ) / 1 , the effort function reduces to
e e w s u = - ( ,( ), ) 1 (9)
where effort rises in all three arguments. With the equilibrium wage and under utilization
rate, (9) yields the optimal effort rate.
Labor Markets
We assume that R&D workers can work in the lab and on the factory floor while
production workers only can work on the factory floor, but not in the lab. If demand for
R&D workers drop, R&D workers are driven down on the factory floor and have to10
accept lower pay.9 With w p = 1, each leader employs E
 /8 workers for production. Full
employment  in the labor market for production workers then implies that
L uL E p r + = / , l (10)
holds. Supply of labor for production, i.e. the fixed supply of production labor,  Lp, plus
the number of workers that are not hired in the R&D lab, uLr, equals demand for labor.
As firms do R&D they demand R workers per industry. Thus, full employment of R&D
labor in terms of number of workers( ) 1-u Lr
 implies that
( ) . 1- = u Lr l   (11)
Expenditures
Steady state consumer expenditure E
  must equal total wage incomes plus interest
income on assets owned minus taxes paid to finance the R&D subsidy. The value of all
assets equals the stock market value of all leader firms, i.e.u = - w s e ( ) / 1 in equilibrium.
Thenru  are the interest incomes.
To determine the amounts of  taxes that should be raised to finance the R&D
subsidies, we note that ( ) 1-u Lr workers do R&D. These workers are paid
w u Lr ( ) 1- and the government pays the fraction s  of this wage bill. Thus the
government must raise sw u Lr ( ) 1-  in taxes to finance the R&D subsidy. Putting this all
together, consumer expenditures become
 E L uL w u L w s e sw u L p r r r = + + - + - - - ( ) ( ) / ( ) . 1 1 1 r               (12)
We now have six equations that constitute the basic model: one R&D equilibrium
condition (7), one wage setting equation (8), one effort equation (9), one production
labor market condition (10), one R&D labor market equilibrium condition (11), and one
expenditure condition (12). These six equations determine five variables  w e E , , ,l and
u. However, it is easily checked that equation (12) is implied by the other five equations
so that this equation may be dropped.
For the understanding of the mechanics of the model it may be useful to discuss its
                                                       
9 We could have assumed that R&D workers get unemployed. However, with competitive wages for
production workers they would be fully employed and it seems to go against empirical facts to have
unemployment among researchers and full employment among production workers.11
solution. Assume a given number of R&D workers in the lab,  l. Together with
equation (11) this gives the share of R&D workers at the factory floor, u, and with
knowledge about this share we get the wage rate, w , and the effort level, e, from
equations (8) and (9). We may also determine expenditures, E , in equation (10). Finally,
with a value of expenditures, we may determine the equilibrium number of R&D
workers, l, from (7). Besides these simultaneously determined endogenous variables,
the model then straightforwardly determines a number of other variables that are of
central interest and to which we now turn.
Welfare and Growth
We calculate consumer welfare, i.e. discounted consumer utility, starting from time t=0.
Remember that all consumers are assumed to have identical preferences. Consider first
the utility of a consumer with steady state expenditure denotede . At any point in time,
this consumer only buys the highest quality product in each industry, and from (3), this
consumer’s static demand function is given by d(j,t,T)=e /p(j,t,T). This  consumer buys
from a leader charging the pricel . Before we substitute this information into (2) we
note that, in this equation,  log log l w l d tI = ￿
0
1
  where I is the steady state industry-wide
instantaneous probability of R&D success.10 The instantaneous probability of R&D
success is el. Substituting all the above information into (2) yields the consumer’s
instantaneous utility
 log ( ) log . U t te
s = l l (13)
The time derivatives of log U
s(t) is then g e = llogl  which therefore represents the
growth rate of utility. (Remember that utility derived from the effort part for R&D
workers in equation (2) is zero at optimum effort e*.)
Real Gross National Product
Nominal gross national product is in the model equal to consumption and since
consumption is identical to consumer expenditures, we have that GNP=E. In a steady-
state equilibrium nominal GNP does not change over time.12
However, growth implies that real GNP rises over time as the quality of the
products improve. With nominal GNP constant in steady-state, we must have deflation in
terms of the quality adjusted (real) price. With the R&D intensity el, a typical R&D
race has time duration equal to its inverse 
1
el
. The relationship between the quality-
adjusted price after the innovation (Pra) and before the innovation (Prb ) is Pra = Prb /8. It
follows that a real price index Pr (t) must satisfy Pr (
1
el




where A represents the inflation rate. Solving yields the quality adjusted inflation rate as
A=-el log8. To simplify, assume that the price index takes on a unity value at time t=0.
The real GNP at time t equals E/Pr (t), or
r GNP = E te ). exp( log l l (14)
Hence, real GNP grows at the utility growth rate in (13), g e = llogl . The growth rate
is made up of the product of the instantaneous probability of winning a race and logl ,
i.e. the increase in the quality of goods that follow from a research breakthrough.  Note
also that the growth rate of utility and real GNP is identical to the rate of deflation.
To evaluate overall consumer welfare, we set e = E . Substituting  (13) into (1)
we get W U = (e ) / + (E / ) ” r l r l llog log  where W denotes the welfare level.
Moreover, merging  g with this expression, and utilizing (4) and the fact that  p = l , we
find that  welfare is
W g E g d = + = + / log( / )) / log r l r (15)
i.e. the sum of discounted growth and static demand. To obtain the welfare effects, we
need to consider, besides growth, also expenditures.
3.  Comparative Static Results.
We turn now to an evaluation of the comparative static effects. The equation system (7)
through (11) may be simplified further. Solving for E in (10) and plugging the result into
(7) and similarly eliminating l, yields a three equation system that solves for w e , and u
and the formal derivations are presented in appendix. Below we discuss the main results.
                                                                                                                                                                 
10  See Grossman and Helpman (1991a, p. 50).13
Effects of increases in R&D workers
We first investigate the effects of an increase in the number of R&D workers. We can
think of this case either as a policy that raises the number of skilled in the native labor
force or as an immigration quota of high skilled workers, of course without
consideration of the effects on the emigration country.11 First, an increase in the supply
of R&D workers,  Lr , unambiguously raises expenditures which raises demand for goods
and for production workers. But since profits rise in expenditures (equation (7)), it also
tends to raise demand for R&D workers. The net effect of increases in demand for both
types of workers is an increase in the share of R&D workers employed in production,
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u L p r <0 and where D is the positively
signed determinant (see appendix). Note that e1is the partial effect of an increase in





is the total effect on effort of a wage






The increase in the under utilization rate of R&D workers implies that the risk of
being forced to work at a lower wage as a production worker rises, and from basic
efficiency wage theory, effort goes up, as seen in (9). However, this effort increase gives
the firms incentives to adjust the wage to fulfill the wage setting condition (8) and having










This, in turn, tends to reduce effort in the new equilibrium. As the R&D workers have
experienced an increase in the share of workers going to the factory floor, which raises
effort, and a wage decrease, which lowers effort, we need to determine the net effect.
                                                       
11 For an analysis of the effects of immigration on growth in a two-country setting, see Lundborg and
Segerstrom (1999).14










The increased availability of R&D workers will raise the absolute number of R&D
workers in production (via higher u) as well as in the lab. The effect on the number of













R&D inputs will increase by ( ) 1- u but since u rises an increasing share of R&D
workers will be under utilized.
With the effects on R&D inputs and on effort, we are ready to consider the growth








L r r = + e e
l (20)
implying that more R&D workers will raise growth as long as the absolute value of the
(negative) elasticity of e with respect to Lr ,eL
e
r , is not larger than the (positive )
elasticity of lwith respect to  Lr ,eLr
l . The growth effect cannot be signed on theoretical
grounds and we cannot rule out the possibility that the drop in effort is of such a
magnitude that it outweighs the increase in the number of R&D workers and hence that
a larger supply of R&D workers inhibits growth. Yet, one might expect only a small
decrease in effort that cannot compensate for the increase in R&D inputs so that growth
is stimulated.
However, even if growth rises, we cannot be sure that welfare rises. As is clear
from (15)  also expenditures, i.e. current consumption, must be taken into consideration.
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0      (21)
Hence, a larger number of R&D workers has ambiguous effects on expenditures per
worker. If the marginal effect on expenditures is larger than average expenditures, an
increase in R&D workers raises expenditures per worker and hence also tends to raise
welfare per worker. The actual outcome depends on the effects of the increase in R&D15
workers on the wage, under utilization as well as effort. Since the R&D workers’ wage
relative the production workers’ is high, we expect that expenditures per worker rises,
which, in turn, implies that the increase in R&D workers has a positive effect on welfare
per worker via expenditures. To sum up, while both the growth and the expenditure
effects are theoretically ambiguous, we have reason to believe that the positive effects
dominate and that an increase in the number of R&D workers raises welfare per worker.
Effects of increases in the number of production workers
It is natural to compare the effects of increases in R&D workers to those of an increase
in production workers. This can be thought of either as an increase in the native
unskilled labor force, or as the effects of an immigration quota for production (unskilled)
workers. Also in this case expenditures rise which increases profits of firms (equation
(7)) and for the R&D equilibrium condition to be fulfilled, the number of R&D workers
































>0. Equation (22) implies that the increase in production workers
releases a number of R&D workers that go back to the lab. The drop in under utilization
of R&D workers moreover tends to reduce effort and to counteract this ”windfall loss”,
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From (11) we know that the decrease in u implies that the number of R&D workers









f = - 0. (25)
Thus, as the number of production workers increases, firms will employ more R&D
workers in the lab and less R&D workers will be demanded at the factory floor. This
spill-over effect tends to stimulate growth. At the same time, effort among the individual
R&D workers rises and both effects should have positive growth effects. The growth








L p p = + > e e
l 0. (26)
Hence, there are unambiguously positive growth effects of more production
workers. This is in contrast to the case of an increase in R&D workers which lowers
growth if the effort effect is low enough.
To evaluate the welfare effects we need to consider again the expenditure effects.
As for increases in R&D workers there is a positive welfare effect as expenditures, and
hence consumption, rises. However, as for the effects of an increase in the number of
R&D workers, the effects on welfare per worker are ambiguous as the number of
production workers increases. This is shown by differentiating expenditures per worker
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If the marginal effect on expenditures is larger than the average effect, an increase in the
number of production workers will raise expenditures per worker and contribute to
raising welfare per worker above that caused by the higher growth rate. Since
production workers wage is lower than R&D workers’ wage, we could expect a drop in
per worker expenditures such that welfare per worker would tend to go down.
Can we conclude that increases in the number of production workers have better
potential to raise growth and welfare than increases in the number of R&D workers? No,
this would be a premature conclusion. It is true that an increase in R&D workers lowers
effort in the model and that increases in production workers raise effort which supports
such a conclusion. However, we should remember that the increase in the number of
R&D workers has an impact effect on R&D inputs of 1-uwhile a corresponding effect is17
not present as production workers rise in number. In the latter case, increases in R&D
inputs only come about via the adjustment in terms of a lowered u. As implied by
equation (11) there is a direct positive effect on lof increases in  Lr and a indirect
negative effect via uwhile there is only an indirect positive effect on lof increases in
Lp . Yet, as compared to static models of immigration that lead to the conclusion that
immigration of skilled workers is preferable to immigration of unskilled, the present
model must be said to cast considerable doubts on the generality of such a conclusion.
Effects of higher education.
It is straightforward to extend the above arguments by investigating the effects of
education, i.e. to see what happens if production workers transform, via free education,
into R&D workers. We do not intend here to offer a model of endogenous human capital
formation since we have assumed that workers are born either with a skill to learn and
do R&D or not born with this skill. Our purpose is consequently limited to showing the
quite unexpected effects of a production worker who one morning wakes up with the
skill to do R&D and therefore gets employed at the lab instead of at the factory floor.12
If we increase  Lr and decrease  Lp, we first note that the share of R&D workers
that is relegated to the factory floor increases; both the increase in  Lr  and the decrease
in Lptend to increase the under utilization rate and this will counteract the initial positive
effects of the increase in R&D workers. The increased under utilization rate drives up
research effort. On the other hand, we have shown that both the increase in  Lr as well as
the decrease in  Lphave negative effects on the relative wage of R&D workers and the
downward wage pressure unambiguously reduces effort. The net effect on effort
as Lr increases and the net effect on effort as Lpdecreases were previously shown to be
negative so that we have an unambiguously negative effort effect.
The most interesting effects occur on the growth rate of the economy. As noted,
growth is the added effects of changes in effort and R&D quantities. First, effort drops
                                                       
12 Endogenous human capital formation has been studied notably in Lucas (1988) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991b).18
since increases in R&D workers and decreases in production workers both have this
effect. The increase in R&D workers raises l by (1-u) as a direct effect but also lowers
l since u, the under utilization rate, rises. Moreover, the decrease in production
workers unambiguously increases the under utilization rate. Thus, while there is one
positive effect on the growth rate, this is counteracted by two negative effects on work
morale and two effects that tend to reduce growth via a lower utilization rate of R&D
workers. This gives surprisingly strong reasons to question that education has such
strong growth effects that often are claimed. These negative effects would not appear in
standard competitive models where effort (implicitly) is constant and all R&D workers
are fully utilized. The competitive model would only capture the positive effects in terms
of higher inputs of R&D.13 Remember also that we have suppressed all costs involved in
educating a production worker to a researcher.14
Effects of subsidies
Can economic policy stimulate growth and welfare? The purpose of an R&D subsidy is
to support firms’ R&D activities by lowering the costs. To see if this is the case, we first
study how firms allocate R&D workers between the lab and the factory floor. The effect
on the under utilization rate is






















































u L p r r 2
2 1 1 ( )( ) / ( ( ) ) - + + - >0.  Equation (28) implies, together
with (11), that the number of R&D workers in the lab rises. For equation (12) to be
fulfilled, expenditures must come down (via higher taxes).
As the under utilization rate drops, effort tends to go down (equation (9)).
Following this shift, firms must reconsider the wage rate and to fulfill the equilibrium
condition (8), the wage will be revised upwards:
                                                       
13 Cf. Grossman and Helpman (1991b).
14 We have not endogenized the education decision but the qualitative effects we obtain in the model in
no way hinge on the equilibrium conditions of the marginal production worker who becomes skilled.19





































where  M = L w s
e
u L r r ( ( )) / ( ( ) ) l
r
- + - + - 1 1 1 >0.  (29) implies that the subsidy tends
to spill-over into a positive wage effect benefiting the R&D workers.
To see the effects on equilibrium effort we first note from (9) that the increase
ins lowers the value of the second argument in the effort function which tends to raise
effort. This positive impact effect on effort occurs since s  lowers the expected returns
from doing R&D which in our fair wage framework stimulates effort. The general
equilibrium effects are:










































As ufalls, effort tends to go down but counteracting this effect is the direct effect on
effort of an increase in s and the increase in R&D workers’ wage.
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the subsidy not only stimulates firms to hire
more R&D workers in the labs but also that it stimulates each R&D workers’ effort.
Consequently, the growth rate unambiguously goes up. Hence, in an efficiency wage
model of the fair wage variety there is an added positive growth effect emanating from
more effort due to higher relative wages of the R&D workers.
We noted though that expenditures go down. With positive growth effects and
negative effects on expenditures, we cannot sign the welfare effects.
Effects of productivity increases.
We may interpret an increase in l  as an increase in productivity since this parameter, for
given inputs in efficiency units, raises the increase in quality improvement. If each
research breakthrough implies a larger step on the quality ladder, we should expect firms



























( ) p (31)
which, from (11), implies that lrises. The fact that ufalls implies that effort tends to fall20



































































The effect on growth is unambiguously positive and for three reasons. First, a higherl
does itself have a directly positive growth effect since g e = llogl . Secondly, lrises










we r r l l l
r
= - + + - - + - ( ) ( )( ( ) ( )) 1 1 1 1 0 1 f  for reasonable values
of the R&D subsidy. Hence, as both growth and expenditures go up, the effect on
welfare is unambiguously positive.
Table 1 summarizes our findings. In general the growth effects are unambiguous,
though we in three out of four cases obtain ambiguous effects on welfare per worker.
Table. 1.  Effects on endogenous variables of changes in exogenous variables and
parameters. +- = ambiguous effects. eL
e
r =elasticity of effort with respect to  Lr and
eLr
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e
L r r e e
f
p
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DLp>0 + + + + - +- +-
DLr>0and
DLp<0
+- - +- - + +- +-
Ds>0 + + + + - - +-
Dl >0 + + + + - + +21
4.  Concluding Remarks
Much of the growth literature focuses on firms’ incentives to employ R&D workers as
the driving force of economic growth and the qualitative aspects of the R&D inputs in
firms have consequently been much neglected. We have therefore analyzed a growth
model in which the individual R&D worker determines effort based on fair wage
considerations for which we have argued there exist ample empirical evidence. Our
results are consistent with the stylized fact that the growth rate need not rise to the
extent predicted by basic endogenous growth theory. In our model, when the supply of
R&D workers increases over time, not only does this raise the under utilization rate of
R&D workers, but it also tends to reduce the work effort of  R&D workers. The growth
effects of increases in R&D workers are theoretically ambiguous and if the adverse
effects on effort are large enough, the growth rate drops. Though we argued that a
negative effect not necessarily is a likely outcome in real economies, changes in work
effort may, nevertheless, inhibit the growth process limiting the positive effects of
increased R&D inputs.
Moreover, it is striking that a corresponding adverse effect does not show up as
the number of production workers rises. Our model casts yet more doubts on the
favorable growth effects of higher education. As production workers become R&D
workers a large number of growth inhibiting effects show up: Several mechanisms lower
effort as well as the share of R&D workers employed in the labs. These effects have no
room in comparable growth models based on competitive wage setting which for this
reason can be argued to exaggerate the growth effects of higher education. Moreover,
the fact that human capital trends upwards and growth rates do not for the OECD
countries, is one reason why Jones (1995a) reject the so called ”AK”-style growth
models of Romer, while the observation is easily explained in our model.
Can we realistically believe that changes in R&D workers’ effort can be of such a
magnitude that long run increases in the number of R&D workers do not materialize in
higher recorded growth rates? OECD countries have experienced large increases
in Lr and consequently also increases in R&D inputs, l, as predicted by our model.
Jones (1995a) showed that the increases in l, i.e. the actual number of R&D workers22
employed in the labs, have not yielded the expected growth effects. That increases
inldo not affect the growth rate g  can in our model only be explained by large adverse
effort effects. Data on workers’ effort are not collected by statistical bureaus which
makes an empirical evaluation very hard. But much evidence suggest that changes in
effort may matter. As noted in the introduction there are convincing evidence that
sociological and psychological aspects in the form of fair wage considerations matter to
workers’ behavior. Nor can we realistically doubt that the firms that participate in R&D
races should have very strong incentives to extract top performance out of their R&D
workers in the laboratories. Firms also go a long way to find compensation policies that
serve the purpose of stimulating hard work, particularly among workers in key positions.
There are also evidence, albeit much of an anecdotal nature, that people work very hard
in the tiger economies. Though we do not necessarily believe that long run changes in
effort are highly important, the existence of adverse work morale effects might still be
one part of the explanation why it is difficult to empirically trace the growth effects of
increases in the physical number of R&D workers in the high income countries.
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APPENDIX
The equation system (7) through (11) may first be simplified by solving for E in (11) and
plugging the result into (7) and similarly eliminating l. This yields the following three
equation system that, by means of standard methods, solves for w e , and u:
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and when solving the model with standard methods, the results reported in the text
obtain.25
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